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I. INTRODUCTION
Following World War II The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
was set up to settle disputes between nations.' Prior to 1985 the United
States was an ICJ member, and accepted compulsory jurisdiction in
many instances. However, the question of whether an ICJ decision can
be successfully enforced against the United States in a U.S. court has
never been litigated. Therefore, it is not known whether the United
States government could be sued to implement an ICJ decision or
whether an ICJ judgment is binding upon the United States Supreme
Court. The answer to each of these questions depends upon a variety of
issues. First a party seeking enforcement of an ICJ judgment must
have standing in a U.S. court. Second, the attempt to enforce an ICJ
decision may raise political questions with which a U.S. court would
refuse to become involved. Third, it is uncertain whether the ICJ ena-
bling statute, in and of itself, creates any rights which a private party
could enforce in U.S. courts. Finally, President Reagan's efforts to sus-
pend ICJ jurisdiction may affect each of these issues, and may raise
other issues as well.
This paper will examine the possibility of enforcing an ICJ judg-
ment against the United States. Each of the above-stated issues will be
addressed in light of the recent ICJ judgment favorable to Nicaragua
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed at San Francisco, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 933 (effective Oct. 24, 1945).
(73)
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in their suit against the United States. Particular attention will be paid
to the effect of President Reagan's attempts to modify and suspend ICJ
jurisdiction.
II. ABILITY TO BRING SUIT
A. Standing
To enforce an ICJ judgment a party must be able to bring suit. In
other words, the party seeking enforcement must have an interest or
injury, rising to the level of a case or controversy.2 Clearly, Nicaragua
has suffered an injury3 and thus under normal circumstances would
have access to U.S. courts. However, it must first be determined
whether a foreign nation can be a party to an action maintained in a
U.S. court.
The issue of whether a foreign nation can appear as a party in a
U.S. court was addressed in The Sapphire Case." There, the French
Emperor attempted to bring suit in the United States in his capacity as
sovereign. Responding to the issue of the Emperor's right to appear as
a party in the courts of the United States, Justice Bradley stated;
On this point not the slightest difficulty exists. A foreign sovereign,
as well as any foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature
against any person here, may prosecute it in our courts. To deny
him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly
feeling.5
Thus, U.S. courts generally are open to foreign sovereigns.
Furthermore, a foreign nation will not be denied access to U.S.
courts merely because that nation is unfriendly with the United States.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,6 the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that because Cuban courts were closed to United States
citizens, Cubans should not be allowed access to United States courts.
7
Only governments at war with the United States, and governments not
recognized by the United States will be denied access to United States
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
3. Nicaragua v. United States, Merits Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, June 27, 1986.
(I.L.M. Vol. XXV, No. 5, Sept. 1986, at 1023-1289).
4. 11 Wall 164, 29 L. Ed. 127 (1860).
5. Id. at 167, 29 L. Ed. at 130.
6. 376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1963).
7. Id.
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courts.' The Supreme Court in Sabbatino also rejected the argument
that a break in diplomatic relations with a nation should deny that na-
tion access to the courts of United States.
This Court would hardly be competent to undertake assessments of
varying degrees of friendliness or its absence, and, lacking some
definite touchstone for determination, we are constrained to con-
sider any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign
power as embracing the privilege of resorting to United States
courts.9
Whether the government of Nicaragua will be able to enforce the
ICJ judgment in a U.S. court is not entirely clear. The United States
currently maintains diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, however, if
the contras are able to set up an alternate government and the United
States recognizes that government, then the denial of recognition of the
present Nicaraguan government would bar them from access to United
States courts. Also, because the recognition of a foreign government is
a political act of the executive branch, any such determination binds
the judicial branch.' 0 In addition, the executive branch may also chose
to file a brief requesting that the court deny Nicaragua access to U.S.
courts due to foreign policy considerations. Although this has never
before happened, if the executive department stated that a Nicaraguan
suit to enforce an ICJ decision would interfere with U.S. foreign policy
the court may feel compelled to deny Nicaragua a right to bring suit to
enforce an ICJ judgment.
In the past, U.S. courts have been extremely hesitant to act in
ways which appear to interfere with the President's constitutional obli-
gation to direct foreign policy." However, denying Nicaraguan judicial
access could raise constitutional issues concerning the scope of the
President's power over foreign policy. For instance, Presidential refusal
to honor an ICJ decision may violate the President's duty to uphold
and support the Constitution and all obligations arising thereunder. To
deny Nicaragua standing on the basis that its suit interferes with the
President's exercise of constitutional powers would be ironic since the
very issue Nicaragua would wish to address is whether the exercise of
8. Id. at 410, 84 S. Ct. at 931. See also, Exparte Don Ascanio Colonna, 314 U.S.
510, 62 S. Ct. 373, 86 L.Ed. 379 (1941) (Italy denied access to United States courts in
view of the Trading with the Enemy Act.)
9. Sabbatino, supra note 6, at 410.
10. Id. "Political recognition is exclusively a function of the executive."
II. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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these powers is constitutionally valid.
In addition, any attempt to deny Nicaragua access to U.S. courts
may create problems under a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation existing between the United States and Nicaragua.1 2 Arti-
cle V (1) of this treaty opens U.S. courts to Nicaraguans "both in pur-
suit of and in defense of their rights." 3 The treaty, in and of itself,
does not grant standing to Nicaragua, but states that Nicaragua has
the right to bring suit in a U.S. court if a United States citizen could
do so under similar circumstances. Thus, to deny Nicaragua a chance
to sue simply because the President requested the courts to deny stand-
ing would probably violate this treaty.
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Nicaragua has not yet been implemented by con-
gressional legislation, but the Supreme Court has enforced other non-
executed Treaties of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce in the past.
For example, in Asakrua v. City of Seattle" a city ordinance denying
aliens a right to engage in business was struck down for violating a
Friendship treaty between the United States and Japan which had not
been formally implemented by Congress. Therefore, the Treaty of
Friendship, Navigation and Commerce between the United States and
Nicaragua might prevent a U.S. court from denying access to Nicara-
gua if standing would exist for a U.S. citizen under similar
circumstances.
B. Jurisdiction
Assuming that Nicaragua has standing, suit to enforce the ICJ
judgment could be brought in a federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331, i.e., federal question jurisdiction. 5 Specifically, the constitutional
question at issue would be the President's authority to disregard an ICJ
decision.
Alternatively, suit could be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1350,16
which provides aliens with the right to bring suit in a U.S. court for
any tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. Although the term "alien" is not defined in the statute,
the definition should encompass a foreign government thereby allowing
12. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United
States -Nicaragua, 9 UST 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (effective May 24, 1958).
13. Id. at art. V(1).
14. 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct. 515 (1924).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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Nicaragua to bring suit. In Swiss Confederation v. United States7 the
United States Court of Claims held, under a similar statute, aliens who
are citizens or subjects of a recognized foreign government, could sue
in U.S. courts."8 The statute was construed broadly to afford foreign
governments the right to sue in the U.S. Court of Claims. Further, the
courts have also decided that foreign governments are "persons" who
may sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws.19 In Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India,20 it was held that even though Congress had
never considered whether a foreign government should be considered a
person under the antitrust laws, this term should be costrued broadly to
cover foreign governments. Taken together Swiss Confederation and
Pfizer seem to indicate that on jurisdictional issues the courts tend to
construe statutes broadly to include foreign governments. Therefore it
seems very probable that the term aliens in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 would be
read to include foreign governments.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is
broad presidential power to act unilaterally in the area of foreign af-
fairs. Since the exact extent of this power is unclear under the Consti-
tution, a court called upon to consider the legality of military action
taken unilaterally by the executive may find this to be a nonjusticiable
political question best left for Congress and the President to resolve.
However, even if a foreign government is considered an alien, that
government would need to hurdle the problem of sovereign immunity.
At least one circuit court of appeals has held that § 1350 is not a
waiver of sovereign immunity. In Canadian Transport Co. v. United
States,2 1 a Canadian company was prevented from suing the United
States Government for violating the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion of 1815 between the United States and Great Britain. Under the
Canadian Transport decision a separate basis for waiver of sovereign
immunity is required before suit can be brought against the United
States under § 1350.22 It is also possible that, in light of the Court's
holding in Canadian Transport, a separate basis for waiver of sovereign
immunity must exist even when a foreign government wishes to sue
under § 1331, i.e., federal question jurisdiction.S
17. 70 F. Supp. 235 (1947).
18. 28 U.S.C., § 261 (1940 ed.). (Presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2502.)
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
20. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 43 U.S. 308, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978).
21. 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 1092-93.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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In most cases the Federal Tort Claims Act24 is the basis for the
waiver of sovereign immunity. However, under a special exemption25
the United States does not waive sovereign immunity for torts occur-
ring in a foreign country. Because the damage and treaty violations for
which Nicaragua wishes to recover occurred in Nicaragua, the Federal
Tort Claims Act will not serve as a basis for waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in this case.
To overcome these problems, Nicaragua could bring suit in a fed-
eral district court requesting a writ of mandamus requiring that the
ICJ judgment be implemented under 28 USC § 1361.26 In order for
the mandamus to issue the court must find that the ICJ decision is
considered the law of the land, 27 because a writ of mandamus cannot
be granted if there is any discretion in the execution of the act. In
addition, the court must find an affirmative duty to act.28 Therefore, a
writ of mandamus will only be available only if the President has an
affirmative duty to enforce the ICJ decision.2 9
Further, even if the standards for issuance of the writ of manda-
mus are met, the court may still exercise a certain discretion. "That the
statute permits the issuance of mandamus does not require its issuance.
Mandamus is issued at the discretion of the court." 30 Therefore, the
court could deliberate on the merits, find the decision binding on the
United States and still refuse to issue the writ of mandamus, because
the writ ordering enforcement of the ICJ judgment would clearly em-
barrass the government. The court might also determine that it should
not involve itself in foreign affairs and therefore refuse to issue the
writ. Finally, the court might refuse to decide the merits of the case
and simply state that mandamus is an inappropriate remedy even if the
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(K). "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to...
(K) Any claim arising in a Foreign country."
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1361, "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus."
27. That is to say the ICJ treaty must be self-executing. For a discussion of this
see infra at 81-87.
28. See, Rural Electrification Administration v. Northern States Power Co., 373
F.2d 686, cert. denied 387 U.S. 945, 87 S. Ct. 686 (1967).
29. It is permissible to issue a writ of mandamus against the President of the
United States, see, Wildlife Federation v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 923 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
30. Id. See also, United States ex rel Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 260, 53
S. Ct. 614, 77 L.Ed. 1250 (1933). "The Court, in its discretion, may refuse.. .to give a
[mandamus] remedy which would work a public injury or embarrassment." Id. at 360.
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President has a duty to follow the ICJ decision.
It seems, therefore, that even if the ICJ decision is binding on the
United States, it is not at all clear whether Nicaragua could enforce
decision in United States courts. Lastly in the event that the United
States is bound by treaty to the ICJ, Congress or a group of congress-
men may be allowed to challenge the President if he fails to implement
the decision. Whether congressmen have standing to sue the executive
is still uncertain. In 1979, the Supreme Court dismissed a suit brought
by several congressmen against President Carter for terminating the
Mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, 31 but did not resolve
the standing issue. Four members of the Court"2 believed that the issue
was a political question;33 of the remaining five, none specifically ad-
dressed the issue of standing.
A few lower court decisions, however, have addressed this issue. In
Kennedy v. Sampson,3 4 the Court found that a Senator possessed
standing to challenge an attempted pocket veto of legislation for which
that Senator had voted. However, Harrington v. Bush 35 involved a suit
brought by congressmen against the director of the CIA; standing was
denied. Standing in Harrington was claimed on three grounds. First,
the plaintiffs asserted that disclosure of the information sought would
"bear upon" their ability to consider impeaching the defendants.36 Sec-
ond, disclosure would bear upon the plaintiff's duty to make appropria-
tions.37 Third, disclosure would bear upon the plaintiff's right to enact
other civil legislation. 8 The D.C. District Court of Appeals ruled that
none of these interests constituted real injury which would confer
standing to the plaintiffs. The court went on to state that, even assum-
ing the CIA's action was illegal "[t]hese assumptions as to illegality do
not in and of themselves confer standing on anyone to challenge the
illegality. '3 9 Thus, a Congressman still might lack standing to sue the
President for failure to comply with an ICJ decision binding on the
United States.
In response, however, it could be argued that because a President's
31. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997, 100 S. Ct. 533, 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (1979).
32. They were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart and Stevens.
33. See infra at 80-81 for a more detailed discussion on the political question
issue.
34. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir., 1974).
35. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir., 1977).
36. Id. at 198.
37. Id. at 199.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 197.
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failure to comply with a valid treaty is tantamount to a unilateral
amendment to the treaty without the consent of the Senate; the Presi-
dent's failure to honor an ICJ judgment is tantamount to an amend-
ment of the ICJ treaty. The acceptance of the ICJ statute was ratified
by the United States Senate in accordance with the Constitutional re-
quirements. 0 If such an unilateral treaty amendment is allowed, the
Senate's power to advise and consent on treaties would be undercut -
once a treaty was ratified by the Senate, the President could change the
terms of the treaty by simply ignoring provisions of which he did not
approve. This unilateral executive action would cause institutional
harm to the Senate. This argument would be much more analogous to
Kennedy, where standing was found, than Harrington, where standing
was not found. On the other hand, the weakness of this argument is
that it could also extend to invalidate any Presidential action in viola-
tion of law. Any executive action that might violate a law could be
arguably a unilateral change of the law depriving the Congress of its
authority to change or suspend the law. Thus, anytime the President
took action which might violate a law Congress would have standing to
sue. It should be noted that the courts have been very reluctant to ac-
cept such a conclusion.
C. Political Question
Assuming a court did find that a plaintiff had standing and that a
court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit to enforce an ICJ decision, the
court would next consider whether the issue presented a political ques-
tion. The political question doctrine, as developed by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr"' states that, under certain circumstances, a
court should refuse to adjudicate an issue that should properly be de-
cided by another branch of the government. The Supreme Court in
Baker identified several areas, including foreign relations, where the
courts should defer to another branch. However, Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion stated, "it is error to suppose that every case or contro-
versy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cogni-
zance." 2 Thus, a political question is not automatically raised merely
because foreign relations are at issue in a case. In the case of a law suit
brought by Nicaragua, the President may request that the courts to
abstain from rendering a judgment because it may interfere with the
administration's policy toward Nicaragua. Such a suit would certainly
40. 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
41. 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
42. Id. at 211.
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address allegations of hostile actions by the United States government
against the Nicaraguan government and Justice Brennan has stated, in
Baker v. Carr, that dates and durations of hostilities shall be consid-
ered political question.4
The President may be required to conform to certain constitutional
procedures if he expects the courts to honor his request. For instance,
although Congress has the power to declare war, and is empowered to
appropriate all moneys that the government spends. Past administra-
tions have carried out military actions without a Congressional declara-
tion of war. 44 Courts may find that the political question doctrine does
not apply to hostilities if the President is acting unilaterally because in
such circumstances the judiciary may be the only branch that can
check the President.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized
very broad Presidential powers in the area of foreign affairs45 so that
even if the President did act unilaterally, a court might decide that the
issue is a political question. Since the exact extent of the President's
power to take unilateral military actions under the constitution is not
clear, a court might decide that the President and the Congress should
work out this issue. This position is similar to that adopted by a plural-
ity in Goldwater v. Carter" where four Justices led by Justice Rehn-
quist, stated that since the constitution does not specify which govern-
ment branch has the power to terminate treaties, the matter should not
be judicially settled but rather the other two branches should resolve
the issue. Although that issue seems distinguishable from the question
considered in this article, it does demonstrate that U.S. courts are often
reluctant to interfere with activities involving foreign affairs under-
taken by another branch of government, even if the action would be
reviewable under other circumstances. Therefore, a court might still re-
fuse to hear a suit to enforce an ICJ judgment involving United States
hostilities against a foreign government even if standing and jurisdic-
tion are recognized.
43. Id. at 213.
44. For example, President Truman's actions in Korea and the actions of Presi-
dents Johnson and Nixon in Southeast Asia.
45. United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct.
216 (1936).
46. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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Ill. ENFORCING A TREATY
A. Self-Executing Agreements
In general, treaties are merely compacts between nations and cre-
ate no rights for individuals. This principle was set forth by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Foster and Elam v. Neilson:47
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legis-
lative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be
accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial;
but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respec-
tive parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision.48
Despite the fact that treaties are the law of the land under the Consti-
tution, the Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between stat-
utes and treaties. Treaties which are self-executing are treated like
statutes. Treaties which are not self-executing do not grant rights to
anyone absent Congressional action. The distinction between self-exe-
cuting and nonself-executing treaties is not always easy to ascertain.
The Supreme Court gave a brief description of a self-executing treaty
in the Head Money Cases:
A treaty then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, when-
ever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the pri-
vate citizens or subjects may be determined. And when such rights
are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court re-
sorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it
would a statute.4 9
The rule from the Head Money Cases lends little aid in interpret-
ing the ICJ statute. The ICJ statute lays out very exact procedures as
to how disputes between nations are to be settled.50 If the ICJ has al-
47. 27 U.S. (2 Peter) 253, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829).
48. Id. at 313-14, 7 L.Ed. 415, 436.
49. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99, 5 S.Ct. 247, 254, 28 L.Ed. 798
(1884).
50. Dreyfus v. Von Fink, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (1976). "It is only when a treaty is self-
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ready adjudicated the issues involved, these issues might very often be
of a nature to be enforced by a court. However, this presumption may
be disputed with regards to Nicaragua's suit against the United States.
When the United States first appeared before the ICJ to dispute that
tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction over Nicaragua's suit, the United
States argued that the dispute was so intertwined with political factors
that no court could settle it.51 Although the ICJ rejected this argument,
it may be renewed before a U.S. court in order to dissuade the judici-
ary from enforcing the ICJ judgment and to compel the court to hold
that, considering the political nature of the dispute, the ICJ judgment
in favor of Nicaragua cannot be enforced.
Such a decision raises the question of whether a U.S. court should
ever enforce an ICJ judgment because some of them surely involve po-
litical questions. Any attempt to enforce some ICJ decisions but not
others would be difficult under present judicial philosophy regarding
treaties. For example, a self-executing treaty has the force of an act of
Congress and must therefore be enforced by courts as the law of the
land. Thus, courts do not have the discretion to enforce a self-executing
treaty some of the times but not at others. On the other hand, if the
treaty is not self-executing, there can never be a suit under the treaty
absent Congressional action. Under present judicial reasoning then, the
court must decide to enforce all ICJ decisions or else refuse to enforce
any of the decisions.
In People of Saipan v. United States Dept. of Interior,52 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals laid out several factors to consider in deter-
mining whether a treaty is self-executing. One factor to consider is the
purpose of the treaty and the objectives of the treaty's creators. The
principal objective of the ICJ creators was to promote international
peace which would be an argument for making the treaty self-execut-
ing. Peace is not promoted if countries refuse to abide by ICJ decisions.
Possibly, the attempt to use the ICJ to promote peace has become so
eroded that United States courts will not consider this purpose suffi-
cient to find the statute self-executing. Several major powers, such as
the U.S.S.R. and China, have refused to accept mandatory jurisdiction
of the ICJ.53 Recently Iran refused to follow a judgment of the ICJ.1"
executing, when it prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it
may be relied upon for enforcement of such rights." Emphasis added.
51. Case concerning military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicaragua v. United States), Countermemorial of the United States submitted
August 17, 1984.
52. 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
53. Reservation By the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics To the Convention on
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In deciding if a treaty is self-executing, the intent of the parties is
the determining factor. According to Diggs v. Richards,6 "in deter-
mining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of
the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instru-
ment. ' 56 Language is used to determine that intent. A treaty with the
wording that certain acts "shall be ratified" 5 is not self-executing. A
treaty stating that certain acts are "ratified" is self-executing. 8 The
United Nations Charter states: "Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party." 9 The important word here
seems to be undertakes. Unfortunately, this is a very ambiguous word.
It could mean "will be bound" in which case an ICJ decision would be
self-executing. Undertakes could also mean that "the United States
government agrees to take action to implement decisions of the ICJ."
In this case Congress would be required to act before any rights could
vest under an ICJ decision. At the present time there is no judicial
decision guiding the interpretation of this word thus making it impossi-
ble to determine if the ICJ statute is self-executing. However, it does
seem firmly established that the final decision on whether the treaty is
self-executing must be made by the courts. According to § 154 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relation Law;
(1) Whether an international agreement of the United States is or
is not self-executing is finally determined as a matter of interpreta-
tion by courts in the United States if the issue arises in litigation.60
While the opinion of the executive branch would probably be
given great weight on this matter, the judicial branch alone will decide
this issue ultimately.
the Privileges and Immunities of the United States, 173 U.N.T.S. 369, (deposited Sept.
22, 1953). See also L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 872 (1980).
54. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (United States v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, May 24, 1980 (I.L.M. Vol. XIX, No. 3, May 1980 at 553-584).
55. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir., 1976).
56. Id. at 851.
57. Id.
58. Id. see also, A. EVANS, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of
America, BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L., at 185-86.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
60. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154
(1965).
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B. Obstacles to Enforcement at Self-Executing Agreements
Another factor to consider is the availability and feasibility of al-
ternative enforcement measures. The United Nations Charter itself sets
up an alternative method of enforcing ICJ judgments. Article 94 (2)
states:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party
may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary make recommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment.61
Under this Charter the United Nations Security Council clearly has
the authority to enforce ICJ decisions. Taking the UN Charter and the
ICJ statute together, it can be argued that the treaties envisioned the
Security Council as the proper body to enforce ICJ decisions. However,
the United States retains a veto power over actions taken by the Secur-
ity Council. 62 If the President of the United States decides not to honor
an ICJ decision he can simply instruct the United States Ambassador
to veto any resolution placed before the Security Council to implement
the ICJ decision. Given this situation, the feasibility of enforcing an
ICJ judgment in the Security Council can be seriously questioned. A
U.S. court, however, might still require the plaintiffs to go to the Se-
curity Council, since that is the alternative method of enforcement
specified in the Charter.
A court deciding that the Security Council was the proper body to
enforce an ICJ decision, has two options. First, because the Security
Council possesses the power to enforce ICJ decisions, the court could
find that the Security Council is the only body capable of enforcing an
ICJ decision. However, this conclusion would seem to be inconsistent
with the main purpose of the Charter which is to foster the peaceful
resolution of disputes.6" In accordance with this purpose, the drafters of
the Charter would not have intended to severely limit the impact of an
ICJ decision. Given a desire to maintain peace and security, it would
seem that any method available to enforce an ICJ decision would be
acceptable to the drafters. Thus, it is very unlikely that the drafters
intended such strict interpretation of the Charter.
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
62. A veto power is given to permanent members of the United Nations. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 24(1) and art. 27(3).
63. See U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 1-4 for the purposes of the United Nations.
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The court's second option would be to rule that the parties must
first go before the Security Council, but that a United States courts
will accept jurisdiction in the case that the dispute is not resolved. This
solution is analogous to the exhaustion of remedies concept in other
areas of law. Since the UN Charter establishes a method by which to
enforce an ICJ decision, the parties should at least follow all proceed-
ings prescribed by the Charter before instituting suit in a U.S. court.
This solution would allow the courts to stay out of the dispute until
there remains no other way to settle the controversy.
A final factor to consider is the immediate and long range conse-
quences of finding the treaty to be self-executing or nonself-executing.
This would appear to be the most important factor for a court to con-
sider because the court might not want to restrict future Presidential
actions regarding the ICJ. However, even if the ICJ statute is self-
executing, the United States government is not bound in a true sense
for Congress could pass a statute forbidding enforcement of an ICJ
judgment at any time. Subsequent legislation always overrides antece-
dent treaties.64 Thus, although Congressional action violates treaty ob-
ligations under the ICJ statute, there would be no redress in United
States court for such violation. Therefore, even if the ICJ statute is
self-executing, a court could only intervene in the event of a unilateral
Presidential decision to disregard an ICJ judgment. A U.S. court is
never bound by an ICJ judgment if both the President and the Con-
gress actively opposed enforcement. As a result, this factor has less sig-
nificance than it would appear to have on the surface.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to pass on issues involving
similar provisions of the United Nations Charter. One case in which
the Court had a chance to rule on the status of the United Nations
Charter in the domestic forum was Shelley v. Kraemer." It was
briefed and argued in that case that the UN Charter outlawed racial
discrimination, and that these sections of the Charter were binding on
the United States government. The Supreme Court refused to consider
this issue.
Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that
a Security Council resolution is not judicially enforceable against the
64. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 145(1)
(1965).
(1) An act of Congress enacted after an international agreement of the United
States becomes effective, that is inconsistent with the agreement, supersedes it as
domestic law of the United States, if the purpose of Congress to supersede the
agreement is clearly expressed.
65. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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United States government. In Diggs v. Richardson,66 the plaintiff tried
to enforce a UN resolution calling on its members to sever relations
with South Africa. The court refused to enforce the resolution, stating
''we find that the provisions here in issue were not addressed to the
judicial branch of our government. 6 7 In this respect, however, an ICJ
decision might differ from a resolution of the Security Council or the
General Assembly. The ICJ is itself a judicial body. Whereas the reso-
lutions of the UN are always based on political considerations, the ICJ
supposedly bases its decisions solely on international law. Therefore,
the judicial nature of an ICJ decision may make it more relevant in
domestic legal proceedings than a UN resolution.
C. Money Damages
If a court determines that the ICJ statute is, by its own terms,
self-executing, the court must then determine whether the United
States government can be required to pay any money damages awarded
by the ICJ. According to Henkin:
A treaty cannot appropriate funds: the Constitution expressly pro-
vides that 'no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in Con-
sequence of appropriations made by law'; and a treaty is apparently
not law for this purpose.68
Henkin only cites one source to support this statement, a 1852 circuit
court case Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union.69 The Su-
preme Court has never ruled on this issue. If the Supreme Court adopts
Henkin's view, no treaty which appropriates money will be self-
executing.
Henkin's view appears valid. Congress had to appropriate funds
for both the Louisiana Purchase and the purchase of Alaska, even after
the relevant treaties had been ratified by the Senate. Furthermore, a
federal agency cannot spend money merely because it has been
chartered. Every time a federal agency wishes to spend money, Con-
gress must first make an appropriation. Therefore, it seems logical that
treaties would operate in the same manner. In addition, because the
House of Representatives has no participation in matters involving
treaties other than the appropriations process, the House has an even
66. Supra note 55.
67. Id. at 851.
68. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 159 (1972).
69. 24 Fed. Cas. 344 (1852).
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greater interest in controlling appropriations under treaties than appro-
priations under other domestic laws, which the House helps exact.
Modern tort law provides another analysis of this issue. Over the
past decades Congress has passed statutes that allow recovery of tort
damages from the government without specific legislation authorizing
each recovery. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2414,
Payment of final judgments rendered by a state or foreign court on
tribunal against the United States, or against its agencies or offi-
cials upon obligations or liabilities of the United States, shall be
made on settlements by the General Accounting Office after certifi-
cation by the Attorney General that it is in the interest of the
United States to pay the same. 0
Since the ICJ is a foreign tribunal, collection of the judgment can
only be obtained after the Attorney General has certified that payment
of the ICJ judgment would be in the interest of the United States.
Given the almost certainty that the present Attorney General would
refuse to sign such a certification, there appears to be no way to collect
the ICJ judgment under this statute. The decision whether or not to
certify a judgment for collection seems to be at the sole discretion of
the Attorney General. The Department of Justice Report recom-
mending the passage of this legislation stated:
The draft bill provides that judgments of State and foreign courts
or tribunals shall only be paid after certification by the Attorney
General that it is in the interest of the United States to pay the
same, thus precluding automatic payment with respect to cases in
which such judgments are considered to have been improperly ren-
dered. The draft bill does not and is not intended to waive any im-
munity from suit which the United States may otherwise have. 1
Since the United States' position is that the judgment by the ICJ is not
valid because the ICJ lacked jurisdiction, the Attorney General, under
this statute, has no duty to sign a certification. It is very unlikely that
any court would attempt to review a denial of certification by the At-
torney General. The words "in the interest of the United States" seem
clearly to imply that matters of foreign policy are to be considered
when the Attorney General considers whether or not to sign a certifica-
tion. Therefore, unless at some future date an Attorney General signs a
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2444.
71. 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2440.
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certification to have this judgment paid, it is very unlikely that recovery
can be obtained under the tort recovery laws.
D. Constitutionality of the ICJ Statute
Finally, there may be a very serious constitutional problem if it is
held that the ICJ statute is self-executing and that ICJ judgments are
binding on the United States government. The United States Constitu-
tion states that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.72
Henkin claims that United States' membership in the ICJ does not vio-
late this section of the Constitution73 and focuses on the concurrent
jurisdiction of United States and international courts. There is cer-
tainly nothing unconstitutional about allowing international tribunals to
deal with international issues. But the ICJ statute goes on to state in
Article 60 that:
The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as
to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe
it upon request of party.7
If the ICJ statute is self-executing and binds the United States, the
Supreme Court could be asked to enforce a judgment over which it has
no right of review. The Court must address whether the ICJ could pos-
sibly be considered an inferior court as required by the Constitution.
Clearly, the ICJ acts in a judicial capacity. It is questionable
whether the Congress and the President have the power to set up judi-
cial processes which create binding decisions upon the United States
courts if all United States courts are forbidden to review the decisions.
This would turn on the interpretation of the term "inferior courts." It
seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow a treaty to create
judgments binding on United States courts without a right of review
absent constitutional amendment.
This problem does not exist if the ICJ statute is not self-executing.
If the statute requires Congressional action to implement ICJ decisions,
72. U. S. CONST. art. III § 1.
73. L. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 197.
74. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 1, art. 60.
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the judiciary would not be bound simply by a judicial act of the ICJ.
-Congress has the power to pass legislation implementing an ICJ deci-
sion, indeed, Congress is free to adopt the recommendations of any or-
ganization it chooses without giving rise to constitutional questions.
Congress could also make the ICJ decision advisory with respect to
United States courts. A constitutional problem exists only if the ICJ
decision is binding on the Supreme Court, and if the Court has no right
of review.
If the Supreme Court found that the treaty was an attempt to
create binding judgments on the Court, the whole treaty might be
struck down as unconstitutional. This would be a very drastic action,
and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would nullify the United
States' participation in the ICJ. The Supreme Court has held that the
treaty power is very broad.7 5 More than likely the Court would con-
strue the ICJ statute to be nonself-executing in order to avoid the con-
stitutional issue. It then would be impossible to enforce an ICJ judg-
ment absent Congressional legislation.
IV. TREATY MODIFICATION
Recent actions by President Reagan have changed the status of
the United States' involvement in the ICJ. On April 6, 1984 the United
States notified the ICJ that for two years the United States would not
recognize the Court's jurisdiction over issues relating to Central Ameri-
can.70 It is questionable whether the President has the power to do this.
The ICJ refused to accept the withdrawal. The acceptance of ju-
risdiction by the United States requires six months notice before with-
drawal from ICJ jurisdiction. 7 Therefore, the ICJ did not recognize
the withdrawal immediately. Under Article 36(6) of the ICJ Statute,
the ICJ has the authority to settle jurisdictional disputes. As stated
earlier, ICJ decisions are not reviewable by member states under Arti-
cle 60 of the Statute.7 8
Under U.S. constitutional law it is questionable whether the Presi-
dent has the power to unilaterally change a treaty. The constitutional
issues involved in an attempt to modify the terms of acceptance of ICJ
75. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 422-23, 40 S. Ct. 482, 64 L. Ed. 641
(1920).
76. 1984 ICJ Rep. 392, 398 (I.L.M. Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Jan. 1985).
77. 61 Stat., 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9, deposited with the United
Nations, Aug. 26, 1946.
78. Statute of the Internation Court of Justice, supra note 1, art. 60. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction are discussed generally in a recent note.79 In essence the
President has attempted to amend the Senate's acceptance of ICJ juris-
diction without Senate consent. Under normal procedures, however, a
treaty is amended by seeking the Senate's consent to modifications of
the original treaty. Even in 1979, when the President terminated the
Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, the State Depart-
ment assured the Congress that although the President possessed the
right to terminate treaties, he did not possess the authority to unilater-
ally amend treaties. 80
Because the President's power to modify or amend a treaty is un-
certain, a court might not want to rule on the issue, and Goldwater v.
Carter" seems to suggest that the Supreme Court is not yet ready to
deal with this type of issue. But, if suit were brought to enforce an ICJ
judgment, the Supreme Court might have no choice but to decide
whether the President's attempted modification is valid. However, this
issue would only be reached if the Court first found that the party insti-
tuting suit possessed standing, that the ICJ statute is self-executing,
and that the suit did not raise a nonjusticiable political question. As
discussed above, each of these three issues present serious obstacles to
enforcement of an ICJ decision.
V. CONCLUSION
On October 7, 1985, the President notified the ICJ that the United
States was withdrawing from compulsory ICJ jurisdiction .8 Even if the
President's termination of the ICJ's jurisdiction is valid, Nicaragua
might still be able to sue to enforce an ICJ decision, so long as the ICJ
had jurisdiction over Nicaraguan's case at the time the suit was first
brought. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States" the Supreme Court
stated:
[W]hatever of a permanent character had been executed or vested
under the treaties was not affected by its [termination]. In that re-
spect the abrogation of the obligations of a treaty operates, like the
repeal of a law, only upon the future, leaving transactions executed
79. Lennon, Note: Nicaragua v. United States, AM. J. INT'L L., Vol. 79, 682-89,
July 1985.
80. Treaty Terminations: Hearings before the Senate Comm. of Foreign Rela-
tions, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., 214 (1979).
81. Goldwater v. Carter, supra note 31.
82. I.L.M. XXIV, No. 6, No. 1985.
83. 130 U.S. 581, 9 S.Ct. 623, 321 L.Ed. 1068 (1889).
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under it to stand unaffected .'
Likewise, under 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties the termination of a treaty "does not affect any right, obliga-
tion, or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of
the treaty prior to termination."8 5 At least one court has held that the
Vienna Convention is self-executing. 6 Therefore, in order for the Nica-
raguan government to succeed in a suit to enforce a judgment rendered
by the ICJ, Nicaragua must show that rights under the treaty vested
before the United States' withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Nicaragua could argue that rights vested under the ICJ statute when
the suit was filed, and subsequent United States withdrawal should not
affect Nicaragua's right to have the treaty enforced. There is no way to
determine how successful this argument would be.
Given all of the uncertainties in this area of the law, it is impossi-
ble to determine definitely whether an ICJ judgment could ever be en-
forced in a United States court. Several serious obstacles would have to
be overcome before a court would enforce an ICJ judgment. First, the
party instituting suit must obtain standing. This might be possible but
it is not clear if anyone would be able to meet the standing require-
ments. Second, the spectra of the political question doctrine looms over
this area of the law, ready to preclude a court from even considering
the issues involved. In addition, the greatest problem comes in the area
of the self-execution of treaties. If the ICJ statute is not self-executing,
United States courts cannot enforce an ICJ judgment absent Congres-
sional action. On the other hand, if the statute is self-executing, several
potential constitutional problems arise. Thus, either determination on
the issue of self-execution may defeat the suit. Finally, action by the
President to modify and suspend ICJ jurisdiction creates even greater
uncertainty with regard to the suit brought by Nicaragua against the
United States. Given all of these factors, it would be very difficult to
succeed in any suit to enforce a judgment of the ICJ.
Colton Brown
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